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Abstract 
Individuals are motivated to maintain a positive moral evaluation of social groups t which they 
belong. Accusations of unjust harmdoing on the part of the ingroup threaten the group’s moral 
identity. One strategy for restoring ingroup moral identity after such a threat is competitive 
victimhood: claiming the ingroup has suffered as much or more than the harmed outgroup and 
other relevant groups. Two studies tested this process. In Study 1, male participants were more 
likely to claim that men are discriminated against compared to women after their group was 
accused of harming women. In Study 2, undergraduates were more likely to claim that their 
group is discriminated against compared to other campus groups after undergraduates were 
accused of harming university staff. Competitive victimhood did not occur when outgroup 
victimization was framed as the fault of the outgroup itself (Study 1) or a group other than the 
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“They began by reciting past injuries inflicted by the other group, as if competing  
to see who had suffered more.” 
    - Vamik Volkan (1997, p. 32), describing the first meeting 
       in the United States of Israeli and Egyptian representatives 
 
 Individuals are motivated to maintain a positive moral evaluation of their social group. 
When the ingroup is accused of committing unjustified harm against an outgroup, this can be a 
threat to social identity. In such circumstances, individuals will often strategically attempt to 
obtain higher moral standing for the ingroup in order to defuse the threat. In the modern era, one 
way of obtaining greater “moral credentials” for one’s group (at least under certain 
circumstances) is through claims to relative victim status. As Volkan (1997) describes in the case 
of negotiations between Arab and Israeli leaders, claims of victimhood can imply that one’s 
group deserves retribution, and can even serve to legitimate actions (such as war) which might 
otherwise seem unjustified. Thus an outgroup’s claim to victimhood at the hands of the ingroup 
can pose a social identity threat in the form of an upward social comparison on the moral 
dimension. We hypothesize that this threat can be compensated for through competitive 
victimhood: claiming that one’s ingroup has as much or more victim status than other relevant 
groups. 
Ingroup moral status as a target for social identity threat 
According to social identity theory, individuals define themselves largely in terms of the 
social groups with which they identify, and are motivated to maintain a positive concepti  of 
these groups (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Morality is perhaps the most important dimension on 
which the individual evaluates her ingroup(s). Supporting this idea, Leach, Ellemers and Barreto 
(2007) obtained evidence that a group’s perceived moral status is more important for 
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identification processes (e.g., taking pride in group membership) than a group’s cometence or 
sociability. In addition, studies show that people are more motivated to improve the status of 
their group when they perceive higher status as reflective of higher moral standing s opposed to 
higher competence (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). 
Given that individuals are motivated to see the groups to which they belong as moral, it is 
psychologically threatening when the moral standing of one’s group (relative to other groups) is 
called into question (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Prior work has shown that people are 
motivated to reduce or defend against such threats. For example, a growing body of research 
(e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006) suggests that experiencing guilt i  
connection with illegitimate, harmful actions taken by the ingroup motivates individuals to either 
legitimize the harm or take reparative action to compensate the outgroup. These processes stem 
from a desire to reduce internal distress arising from the perception that the ingroup has 
committed immoral acts (Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006), suggesting that an identity 
threat to the ingroup’s moral status can be highly negative for the individual.  
 This body of work demonstrates that individuals experience a threat to their group’s 
moral identity when reminded of negative ingroup actions, and that individuals are motivated o 
restore group moral identity in the wake of such threats. Such findings are consonant with 
research on moral credentials (Monin & Miller, 2001). From this perspective, performing moral 
acts gives one a feeling of “credit” in a kind of psychological morality ledger. Such moral 
credentials are desirable not only because they affirm one’s moral identity, bu  because this 
affirmation permits a lowered concern with one’s moral standing in subsequent sit ations 
(Monin & Miller, 2001). A guiltworthy or immoral act, on the other hand, implies a kind of 
moral “debt” which one is motivated to reduce in order to reestablish one’s baseline moral 
 
 3
identity (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; May, 1984; Rank, 1996). This understanding fits with 
Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin’s (2009) theory of moral self-regulation, which posits tha  immoral 
acts require compensatory “moral cleansing,” while moral acts provide a sense of “moral 
license” that alleviates a need to prove one’s moral value in future situations. 
 Translating this analysis to the group level, knowledge that one’s group has victimized an 
outgroup induces a personally-distressing sense of moral debt. The individual can either 
acknowledge this debt and attempt to repay it in some way, or she can attempt to void thedebt
using cognitive strategies such as legitimization or minimization of the harm suffered by the 
victim group. A third such “debt-avoidance” strategy proposed here is pursuing competitive 
victimhood. 
Claims to victimhood as competition for moral credentials 
 Victim status – at least at first glance – appears predominantly negative and undesirable, 
given its implications of relative disadvantage, weakness, and low status, and indeed it has 
historically had such negative connotations (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). Nevertheless, in the 
current cultural climate, status as an undeserving victim of illegitimate h rm might be somewhat 
desirable insofar as it appears to confer moral credentials (Strassel, 2001).  
If a group or individual has suffered victimization, in our current society this often 
implies that this party has a right to expect reparations, either symbolic or mate ial. Furthermore, 
victim status appears to afford a certain amount of moral license. Since a victim is by popular 
definition the opposite of a perpetrator (i.e., a victim has suffered some immoral act, s opposed 
to having committed one), a victim is not likely to be seen by others, or to see herself, as having 
a moral debt requiring reparative cleansing. Accordingly, Zitek, Jordan, Monin, and Le ch
(2010) found that perceiving oneself as victimized decreases one’s likelihood of engaging in 
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subsequent possible moral actions, an outcome mediated by feelings of entitlement resulti g 
from one’s victim status. Another potential source of the moral license implied by victimhood is 
the fact that while unprovoked displays of power and aggression tend to be condemned in current 
society, retaliatory aggression or collective action as a result of past victimization is often seen as 
acceptable and even laudable. This proclivity to champion victim action – even when it is violent
– is likely related to the empirically-established preference of individuals for an “underdog” 
figure or group who triumphs, against the odds, over a powerful tyrant (Vandello, Goldschmied, 
& Richards, 2007).  
Thus victim status – beyond tending to keep one out of apparent moral debt – can 
actually give one moral license to commit acts that would normally be condemne, or at least to 
demand an acknowledgment of moral debt from one’s oppressor (Moscovici & Pérez, 2009). In 
general, belonging to a group that perpetrates negative acts against a victim group can induce a 
distressing sense of moral debt, while belonging to a victimized group can induce a positive 
sense of adequate or even high moral status. Partly supporting this idea, Branscombe (1998) 
found that reminding men of unfair advantages they possessed relative to women decreased th ir 
sense of ingroup well-being, while reminding men of ingroup victimization boosted their self-
esteem.  
 Because of this phenomenon, modern social groups can often be observed “competing” 
through direct social comparisons along the moral dimension for public acknowledgment of 
greater victim status. Noor, Brown, & Prentice (2008) refer to this tendency as competitive 
victimhood. These researchers have observed Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland 
attempting – through art, political addresses, and other media – to present the “definitive” 
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version of local history, such that their group emerges as the “true” victim in a saga of mutual 
violence. 
 Working from an even broader sociological perspective, Cole (2007) has noted that, 
although modern attitudes towards claims to group victimhood are complex, “victim politics” are 
commonly used in the modern era to give moral credentials to a group, and to justify collective 
actions that might otherwise be seen as morally debt-incurring. For example, the ongoing debate 
regarding comparative moral justification for the use of military force among Israelis and 
Palestinians largely boils down to an argument over which group can lay greater claim to victim 
status (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). In the United States, the George W. Bush Administratio  d ew 
upon claims to the country’s victim status after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 to 
partly justify military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Cole, 2007). Empirically, Wohl and 
Branscombe (2008) found that, for U.S. participants, reminders of ingroup victimization - 
whether historical (the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack) or topical (the 9/11 attacks) - reduced feelings 
of collective guilt over current U.S. actions in Iraq. Similarly, reminders of past and current 
ingroup victimization increase feelings of collective forgiveness for harmful acts committed by 
the ingroup (Wohl & Branscombe, 2009). Generally, it appears that – at least in the modern
political sphere – claims to victimhood are often directly translatable o claims to moral 
credentials or license. 
 Although ideas of collective victimhood are integral to the social identities of members of 
certain groups (usually disadvantaged groups with a dramatic history of victimization, or groups 
in intractable conflicts; Bar-tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Volkan, 1997), 
conceptions of the ingroup as victimized probably do not form a core part of the identity of many 
members of high status groups in society. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis sugge t  that 
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under conditions of moral social identity threat, even members of higher status groups may 
engage in competitive victimhood in order to reaffirm the ingroup’s moral standing relative to 
that of other groups. Since morality is a relatively ambiguous dimension (Nucci, 1996) that is 
subject to considerable influence from social comparison processes (Monin, 2007), people may 
seek to resolve aversive discrepancies between the moral standing of the ingroup and that of an 
outgroup by competing for moral credentials through claims to relative victimhood. 
Historical trends and complexity in attitudes toward victimhood 
 The idea that victim status confers moral credentials, and that groups may therefore 
compete for it, is modern. Edmund Burke’s (1790/1955) reflections on the rhetorical 
justifications employed during the French Revolution contain one of the first recorded 
formulations of this notion. A century later, Nietzsche (1887/2004) systematically investigated 
the phenomenon of ascribing higher moral status to victimized groups, concluding that it is the 
end result of a somewhat recent historical trend. Drawing on some etymological evidence (and a 
considerable amount of philosophical speculation), Nietzsche argued that, while concepts of 
“good” and “moral” were once associated with power and might, with the rise of Judeo-Christian 
religious thinking, humility, suffering, and martyrdom became more closely associ ted with the 
possession of high moral status.  
Moscovici and Pérez (2009) use sociological data and theory to show that the rise of 
modern liberalism and the concept of “crimes against humanity” over the past three hundred 
years have led to a reversal of moral judgments of the powerful and powerless in society. These 
authors observe that while minority groups were once commonly labeled “deviant” and morally 
inferior, many minority groups now reject such labels to embrace the identity of morally entitled 
victims, an identity which gives them some cultural capital. For example, African Americans and 
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Hindu Dalits (“untouchables”) have a modern history of reinterpreting traditional theological 
narratives to equate their lower social status with higher moral standing (Mahalingam, 2007). At 
the same time, dominant groups once understood as “normative” are now commonly labeled 
guilty and immoral by virtue of their privileged status (see also Williams, 1993).  
This general trend does not imply, however, that apparent victim status will always 
provide moral credentials for historically marginalized or underprivileged groups. Nietzsche’s 
critique of victim or “slave” morality (as he calls it) is an intriguing case study in the complex 
modern attitudes towards victimhood investigated by Cole (2007). Specifically, whi e Nietzsche 
essentially criticizes Judeo-Christian groups for “inverting all values” and falsely equating 
victimhood with virtue, he is implicitly claiming high moral status for those powerful individuals 
in modern society – akin to the Ancient Greeks and Romans, who equated power with morality – 
who are apparently the “true victims” of the Judeo-Christians’ victim politics. Thus Nietzsche 
simultaneously condemns victim politics (explicitly) and practices it to suit his own interests 
(implicitly). Cole (2007) points to the Bush Administration’s use of a similar rheto ical strategy, 
through which the U.S. obtained moral credentials for being the innocent victim of 9/11, but at 
the same time denied credentials to Al Qaeda by condemning their use of “victimist” polemics to 
recruit guerrillas for their ranks. Engaging in competitive victimhood while simultaneously 
decrying the rise of “privileged” victim identities, some members of high status social groups 
have come to believe in the complete reversal of traditional power structures: the mpowered 
believe they have become the “true victims” in a society supporting reparative polici s like 
affirmative action and diversity quotas (D’Souza, 1991; Lynch, 1989). 
The complexity of modern attitudes about victimhood suggests that there are situations in 
which overt claims to victim status on the part of a marginalized group will not provide moral 
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credentials for the group, nor be seen as threatening to dominant group members. The framing of 
victimhood may influence these outcomes. For example, when we engage in the process of 
blaming the victim – when victims are seen as deserving their own victimhood – then victim 
status no longer seems to infer higher moral standing (Harvey, 1995; Ryan, 1976). If victimhood 
is seen as undeserved, it implies a right to retribution, legitimization of activity that might 
otherwise be questionable, and greater moral credentials. If victimhood is under too  as 
deserved, however, then this implies a potential lackof moral credentials to explain how the 
group became a victim group (or at least a lack of competence; for example, we can blame the 
urban poor for their status on grounds of either ignorance or deviant behavior patterns). 
Furthermore, if an outgroup’s victim status is seen as deserved, the ingroup is absolved of 
responsibility, and does not incur any moral debt. This suggests that competitive victimhood 
should not occur in response to information suggesting that an outgroup is deservedly victimized, 
a hypothesis we will test in the current studies. 
The present research 
From the foregoing analysis, two major inferences can be drawn: 1) In the current 
cultural climate, victim status (when undeserved) affords a group moral credentials; and 2) 
because immoral (collective) acts elicit a sense of moral debt, exposure t a portrayal of an 
outgroup as victimized by the ingroup directly threatens one’s moral identity as an ingroup 
member, by eliciting an upward social comparison in which the victimized outgroup appears to 
have moral credentials and the ingroup appears to have moral debt. These inferences yield a 
hypothesis: Exposure to a portrayal of an outgroup as undeservedly victimized by the ingroup 
should prompt the individual to engage in competitive victimhood to reduce the resulting upward 
social comparison in the moral sphere. 
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Study 1 provides a test of the idea that members of an objectively high status group – 
men – will claim greater ingroup victim status in comparison with the outgroup – women – when 
confronted with a portrayal of women as undeservedly victimized. This is a strong test of the 
competitive victimhood hypothesis, given that men are objectively higher status th n women, 
and should not be motivated to make claims to group victimhood if such claims only imply a 
relative drop in status, rather than providing moral credentials (as we hypothesize). In Study 2 
we sought to replicate this effect in another domain by examining the power/class hierarchy on a 
university campus, and to test whether competitive victimhood is a unique response to the moral 
identity threat posed by knowledge that the ingroup has illegitimately victimized another group. 
In both studies, perceptions of victim entitlement to material resources wer measured, in an 
attempt to control for the possibility that claims to ingroup victimhood are driven by material, 
rather than moral, concerns. 
Study 1 
 To the present day, women suffer various forms of social (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009) and 
economic (Gittell, 2009) discrimination in the United States and around the world (United 
Nations, 2007), and remain a lower status group compared to men (e.g., Cudd, 2006). 
Nevertheless, as a paradoxical result of growing awareness of the reality of gender inequality, 
some men – despite their objectively higher status – have come to perceive thems lves as victims 
of gender-based discrimination, often seen as stemming from policies and attitudes counteracting 
discrimination against women (Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997). As mentioned, 
contemplating such victimization of men based on their gender boosts men’s self-esteem 
(Branscombe, 1998).  
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From the present perspective, male perceptions of gender-based discrimination may be 
partly due to competitive victimhood processes. Specifically, we hypothesize that men engage in 
competitive victimhood with women when their ingroup is accused of doing harm to the 
outgroup. To test this hypothesis, we had male participants complete a short online study in 
which they first read an article which portrayed the outgroup as either non-victimized (i.e., 
discrimination against women no longer occurs), deservedly victimized (i.e., discrimination 
against women is the result of female characteristics and choices), or victimized by the ingroup 
(i.e., men are responsible for present discrimination against women). Participants were then 
presented with an opportunity to claim relative victim status for their group in comparison with 
the target outgroup. We expected that men confronted with information suggesting that they are 
responsible for discrimination against women would engage in greater competitive vic imhood 
than men who were not confronted with such information. We anticipated this effect despite the 
fact that men comprise an objectively higher status group than women in modern U.S. society, 
and despite the superficially negative connotations of victim status. As implied by our theoretical 
analysis, we did not expect competitive victimhood to occur when victimization of women was 
framed as deserved, nor when women were described as non-victimized.  
Given the aforementioned observation that victim status is often associated with notions 
of material entitlement in modern social consciousness (e.g., financial reparations; Cole, 2007), it 
is possible that our essay manipulation could influence the extent to which people see victims as 
entitled to material benefits, and that these perceptions might affect the likelihood of competitive 
victimhood. The more people think victims are entitled to material resources in our society, the 
more they might want to claim relative victim status for the ingroup. Contrary to this proposition, 
our analysis expects competitive victimhood to occur in response to moral threat, and not as a
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function of material concerns. To test these differential predictions, we included a measure of 
perceive victim entitlement to material resources. 
Method 
Forty-nine University of Kansas male undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions (portrayal of outgroup: non-victimized vs. self-victimized [victimhood 
deserved] vs. victimized by the ingroup) in a single-variable between-subjects design, with 
competitive victimhood as our dependent measure of interest. All data were collected online 
through the university SONA System. 
In an ostensible study of perspectives on gender issues, participants completed an online 
survey designed using Survey Monkey. Participants first completed a few filler measures 
(designed to distract from the central purpose of the study) and a five-item measure of 
identification as a man (“I often think of myself in terms of being a man,” “Being a man is an 
important reflection of who I am,” “In general, being a man is an important part of my self-
image,” “I identify with other men,” “I feel strong ties with other men;” 1= Strongly disagree, 7 
= Strongly agree; α = .94). This measure was included not only to test for any possible 
moderation by ingroup identification – we expected none – but also to prime participants’ 
category membership. 
Outgroup portrayal (threat to the ingroup) manipulation. Participants then read a 
fabricated news article reporting on the status of women in modern society. This article served as 
the independent variable, and was based on a prior manipulation of perceptions of outgroup 
discrimination (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Postmes, 2003). Specifically, partici nts were 
randomly assigned to read one of three possible news articles (with the author’s gender 
unspecified; see Appendix 1 for full text of each article).  
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In the non-victimized condition, the article argued that women and men have equal 
opportunities for success in modern society, and no mention was made of any group 
victimization. This portrayal of the outgroup served as one of two comparison conditions 
designed to imply no moral threat to the ingroup. 
In the self-victimized (deserved victimhood) condition, the article argued that women are 
discriminated against in modern society, but this discrimination stems from aspects of their own 
biology and life choices. This article contained passages like: “As a result of biological 
differences and choices made by women based on those differences, women are victims of 
widespread discrimination in the workplace and other areas to this day. Due to certain inherent 
characteristics, women experience discrimination despite the fact that men are not responsible 
for its occurrence.” This portrayal of the outgroup served as the second of two comparisn 
conditions designed to imply no moral threat to the ingroup. 
In the victimized by the ingroup condition, the article argued that women are victims of 
discrimination intentionally perpetrated by men. This article contained passages like: “As a result 
of the behaviors and prejudices of men at all levels of society, women are victims of widespread 
discrimination in the workplace and other areas to this day. Because men have an active i terest 
in maintaining their social advantages, discrimination of women continues to occur.” This 
portrayal of the outgroup was designed to present a moral threat to the ingroup. 
Manipulation checks. Participants then completed three manipulation check items to 
assess the effectiveness of the essay manipulation. Specifically, participants rated their level of 
agreement (on a 7-point scale) with the following statements: “In the article you read, women 
were described as victims of discrimination,” “In the article you read, women were described as 
being responsible for the discrimination they experience,” and “In the article you read, the 
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discrimination women experience was described as being the result of men’s action .” To assess 
whether our outgroup portrayal manipulation effectively varied the degree of perceived threat, 
we additionally asked, “Many men would feel threatened by the article that you read.” 
Competitive victimhood. Participants then completed a single-item measure of 
competitive victimhood: “In society, compared to women, men experience ________ 
discrimination” (1 = less overall, 4 = as much, 7 = more overall). 
Perceptions of victim material entitlement. A  the end of the survey we included two 
items assessing perceptions of victim material entitlement to test for any effect of the 
manipulation on these perceptions. Specifically, participants rated their level of agreement (on a 
7-point scale) with the following statements: “In our society, victims of discrimination are 
generally entitled to certain resources, such as financial reparations or increased political power,” 
and “Our society is generally willing to give compensation to groups perceived as having 
suffered discrimination.” These two items correlated significantly (p < .001) at r = .63, and were 
combined to form a single measure of perceptions of victim material entitlement. 
After completing all measures, participants received a thorough debriefing explaining the 
purpose of the experiment, and the fact that the essay was fabricated for the study. 
Results and discussion 
 Manipulation checks. To test the effectiveness of the manipulations, one-way ANOVAs 
(portrayal of outroup: non-victimized vs. self-victimized vs. victimized by the ingroup) were 
conducted on each of the manipulation check items. A significant result was found for the item, 
“In the article you read, women were described as victims of discrimination,” F(2, 46) = 11.42, p 
< .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the self-victimized and victimized-by-
the-ingroup conditions agreed more strongly with this statement compared to participants in the 
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non-victimized condition, ts > 4.0, ps < .01, while participants in the victimized conditions did 
not differ significantly in their level of agreement, p = .87 (MNon-victimized = 2.50; MSelf-victimized = 
5.33; MVictimized by the ingroup = 5.22). For the item, “In the article you read, women were described 
as being responsible for the discrimination they experience,” we also found a significant 
difference, F(2, 46) = 8.71, p < .01, such that participants in the self-victimized condition agreed 
more strongly with this statement compared to all other participants, ts > 3.36, ps < .01, while 
participants in the non-victimized and victimized-by-the-ingroup conditions did not iffer in 
their level of agreement, p = .53 (MSelf-victimized = 4.13; MNon-victimized = 2.00; MVictimized by the ingroup = 
2.33). For the item, “In the article you read, the discrimination women experience was described 
as being the result of men’s actions,” we also obtained a significant result, F(2, 46) = 6.19, p < 
.01. Participants in the victimized-by-the-ingroup condition agreed more strongly with this 
statement compared to all other participants, ts > 2.65, ps < .02, while participants in the non-
victimized and self-victimized conditions did not differ significantly in their l vel of agreement, 
p = .51 (MVictimized by the ingroup = 4.89; MNon-victimized = 3.13; MSelf-victimized = 2.67). Finally, we 
obtained a significant result on the measure of perceived threat, F(2, 46) = 8.21, p < .01. As 
predicted, participants in the victimized-by-the-ingroup condition saw the article as more 
threatening compared to participants in the other conditions, ts > 3.12, ps < .01, while 
participants in the non-victimized and self-victimized conditions did not differ in perceived 
threat, p = .58 (MVictimized by the ingroup = 3.72; MNon-victimized = 2.00; MSelf-victimized = 2.27).  
 Competitive victimhood. A one-way ANOVA was performed on the single-item measure 
of competitive victimhood, which yielded a significant result, F(2, 46) = 3.18, p = .05, η2 = .12. 1 
As predicted, pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the victimized-by-the-ingroup 
condition engaged in significantly more competitive victimhood (M = 2.61, SD = 1.61) 
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compared to participants in the non-victimized (M = 1.69, SD = .79; t(46) = 2.37, p = .02) and 
self-victimized conditions (M = 1.87, SD = .63; t(46) = 1.87, p = .06). Means for the non-
victimized and self-victimized condition participants did not differ, t < 1, p = .66 (see Figure 1 
for a graphical depiction of these results). 
 Perceptions of victim material entitlement. Performing the same analysis on the dual-item 
composite of perceptions of victim entitlement to material resources did not yield a significant 
result, F(2, 46) < 1, p = .58 (MNon-victimized = 3.88; MSelf-victimized = 4.12; MVictimized by the ingroup = 3.67). 
Interestingly, perceptions that victims are materially entitled correlated negatively (but non-
significantly) with competitive victimhood, r = -.13, p = .37.  
 Male participants exposed to a portrayal of women as undeservedly victimized by the 
ingroup (men) felt more morally threatened, and were more likely to engage in competitive 
victimhood, compared to participants in the non-victimized and self-victimized portrayal 
conditions. Participants exposed to a portrayal of women as deservedly victimized, however, 
were not more likely to engage in competitive victimhood compared to men in the non-
victimized control condition. Furthermore, preliminary evidence was found that claims to group 
victimhood are not related to perceptions of mere material entitlement, suggestin  that 
competitive victimhood can be a psychological strategy to defend against moral threat 
independent of desire for power or financial gain. 
 The real-world implications of this particular study are somewhat obvious, given that the 
operationalizations expressly involved two widely recognized social groups that are often 
conceived of as existing in a victimizer-victim relationship (men and women). However, one 
potential limitation of this design stems from the zero-sum nature of a (relatively) dichotomous 
grouping variable like gender. According to our analysis, competitive victimhood is a strategy 
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for restoring the ingroup’s moral identity when the ingroup is accused of causing the undeserved 
victimization of an outgroup. This perspective suggests that if an outgroup is undeservedly 
victimized by another group (i.e., not by the ingroup), no special motivation to engage in 
competitive victimhood will be aroused (because no moral debt has been incurred by the 
ingroup). However, because victimization in dichotomous groups is necessarily either the 
ingroup’s (from the perspective of our study, men’s) fault or is in some sense deserved by the 
outgroup (in the study, women portrayed as victims of their own choices, biology etc.), it is 
difficult to examine the unique importance of ingroup responsibility for the outgrp’s 
undeserved victimization in this context. If women are undeservedly victimized (meaning they 
are not to blame for their victimization), then almost by necessity their victimization is the fault 
of men.  
In the case of non-dichotomous groups, however, responsibility for undeserved 
victimization may lie in a number of places. To take the example of national identity, a U.S. 
citizen who perceives immigrants to her country as victimized (through discrimnatory practices 
etc.) may trace the fault for this victimization either back to the victims themselves (self- or 
“deserved” victimization), to the ingroup, or to some third group (for example, she may see 
immigrants as undeserving victims of oppressive regimes in their native countries which forced 
their immigration). This aspect of non-dichotomous groups suggests a possibility we were unable 
to test in Study 1, namely, that ingroup responsibility for an outgroup’s undeserved victimization 
might not be necessary for competitive victimhood to occur. If status as an undeserving victim 
does in fact confer moral credentials, then it’s possible that individuals will engag  in 
competitive victimhood after exposure to a portrayal of an outgroup as undeservedly victimized 
by any group, and not only by the ingroup. However, if competitive victimhood claims are 
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uniquely motivated by an incurred moral debt – as our analysis suggests – then they should only 
follow from perceptions that the ingroup is responsible for outgroup victimization. 
In Study 2, then, we attempted to replicate and extend our first investigation by 
examining competitive victimhood processes in a context involving multiple groups: the 
class/power hierarchy within a university setting. By doing so, we were able to examine whether 
competitive victimhood occurs only in response to portrayals of an outgroup as victimized by the 
ingroup, or whether this tendency might be activated by portraying an outgroup as undeservedly 
victimized by any group. An additional advantage of examining competitive victimhood in a 
context involving non-dichotomous groups is that we were able to determine whether the 
competitive victimhood strategy only involves competition with the victimized outgr p, or 
whether this motivated competition extends to comparisons with other groups as well.  
Study 2 
 In a field study at the State University of New York at Albany, Tompkins, Fisher, 
Infante, & Tompkins (1975) found evidence for psychological perceptions of a hypothesized 
hierarchy existing within the university system. Specifically, these rarchers asserted that 
administrators (including directors and college deans) form a “high status” group on campus, 
civil service workers or “staff” (secretaries and maintenance workers) form a relative “low 
status” group, and students fall somewhere in between (see Bess & Dee, 2008, for an extended 
discussion of power relationships within a university setting). In Study 2, we used this naturally 
occurring multi-group power hierarchy to further test competitive victimhood prcesses. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that a higher status group (undergraduate students) would be more 
motivated to engage in competitive victimhood after being accused of illegitimately h rming an 
outgroup (university staff, a lower status group). 
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 Beyond testing the motivation for competitive victimhood in a different domain, Study 2 
also expands on Study 1 in multiple ways. First, as mentioned, because Study 2 examines 
motivation for competitive victimhood in a non-dichotomous groups context, we were able to 
better test whether the effect is uniquely driven by accusations of ingroup responsibility for the 
victimization of an outgroup. Having established in Study 1 that competitive victimhood does 
not follow from information suggesting that the outgroup is deservedly victimized, in Study 2 we 
instead focused on testing whether competitive victimhood follows from portrayal of the 
outgroup as undeservedly victimized by any group (and not only by the ingroup). Specifically, 
we hypothesized that undergraduate students would engage in competitive victimhood when 
their ingroup had been accused of victimizing the outgroup (university staff), but not when 
another group (university administrators) had been accused of victimizing the outgroup (because, 
in the latter case, no moral debt on the part of the ingroup is implied).  
 Secondly, in Study 2 we controlled for a possible alternative explanation of the Study 1 
finding. It is possible that contemplating ways in which the ingroup has victimized an outgroup 
simply increases the overall salience of the ingroup’s experiences with vict mhood. In other 
words, rather than competitive victimhood being a motivated process whereby individuals 
attempt to reduce the apparent moral gap between ingroup and outgroup after accusations of 
ingroup harmdoing – as we claim – competitive victimhood might simply be the byproduct of a 
non-motivated increase in the overall salience of the ingroup’s victimhood.  
There are two reasons why we do not believe this to be an adequate explanation of 
competitive victimhood as observed in Study 1. First, the concept of victimhood was made 
equally salient in both the self-victimized and victimized-by-the-ingroup conditions; the amount 
of discrimination experienced by the outgroup was described as the same in each induction, and 
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only the alleged source of the discrimination varied. Nevertheless, more competitive victimhood 
was observed in the victimized-by-the-ingroup condition compared to the self-victimized and no 
victimization conditions. This pattern of results would be unlikely if our competitiv  victimhood 
measure was simply assessing overall salience of victimhood.  
Second, and more importantly, even if there was some unique aspect of priming the 
ingroup’s victimization of the outgroup that led to increased salience of ingroup victimhood, we 
would expect such a process to be quite different from the motivated, comparative process of 
competitive victimhood. Our analysis suggests that competitive claims to victimhood are 
motivated by a moral identity threat which they resolve by establishing the moral credentials of 
the ingroup relative to other groups. In short, from our perspective, the “competitive” aspect of 
competitive victimhood is essential; claims to group victimhood that do not establish the 
ingroup’s victimhood in reference to the victimhood of other groups cannot fulfill the moral
social comparative function posited to lie at the heart of the process. 
In order to provide a stronger test of the moral comparative aspect of competitive 
victimhood, and control for the possibility that salience of ingroup harmdoing simply increases 
salience of ingroup victimhood, in Study 2 we differentiated between noncompetitive and 
competitive claims to group victimhood. Specifically, we asked participants separat ly about 
their perceptions of the ingroup – University of Kansas undergraduates – as victimized without 
reference to any other group (noncompetitive victimhood), and in reference to other relevant 
groups in the university setting: the target outgroup – university staff – as well as faculty and 
graduate students (competitive victimhood). Because perceptions of the ingroup as victimized 
without reference to any outgroup do not serve a direct moral comparative function, we did not 
expect accusations of ingroup harmdoing to increase noncompetitive victimhood. However, 
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because competitive claims to ingroup victim status relative to any relevant outgroup do 
comparatively boost the ingroup’s moral credentials, we expected accusations of ingroup 
harmdoing to increase competitive victimhood in reference to all outgroups (staff, faculty, and 
graduate students). 
Method 
 Thirty-two University of Kansas undergraduates (fourteen female) were randomly 
assigned to one of three conditions (portrayal of outgroup: non-victimized vs. victimized by 
another group vs. victimized by the ingroup) in a single-variable between-subjects design, with 
competitive victimhood as our dependent measure of interest.  
 Portrayal of outgroup (threat to the ingroup) manipulation. Participants entered a 
laboratory to take part in an ostensible study on perceptions of campus life. In the first part of the 
study, participants used headphones to listen to an ostensible audio report prepared by c mpus 
researchers on the computer. The prerecorded audio report (fabricated by the experimenters) 
concerned treatment of university staff, and served as our manipulation (see App ndix 2 for a 
transcript of the audio report in each condition). Across conditions, the report began with 
narration describing an alleged study that had been conducted on campus to investigate the 
treatment of non-student university staff. The study was reputed to have been conducted by 
researchers from different departments at the university, and to have involved nonobtrusive 
observation of and interviews with 100 staff members, as well as surveys and interviews with 
administrators, faculty, and students. 
 In the non-victimized condition, the narrator of the report stated that the results of the 
study indicated that “overall, the KU staff receives treatment that is comparable to that of the 
members of many other university staffs around the country. In particular, KU staff members 
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receive fair treatment from students and administrators.” Later, in an alleged interview segment, 
an ostensible staff member (voiced by one of the experimenters) responded to a question about 
staff treatment by stating: “Overall I’d say it’s pretty good. I worked in different jobs, and even 
at different universities for years now, and I feel treated just as good at KU s anywhere else. 
Most people are fairly decent to you.” This report served as one of two comparison conditions 
designed to imply no moral threat to the ingroup. 
 In the victimized by another group condition, the narrator of the report stated that the 
results of the study indicated that “overall, the KU staff suffers worse treatment than the 
members of many other university staffs around the country. In particular, KU staff members 
receive harsh treatment from the campus administration. Representatives of th  administration 
were routinely observed publicly humiliating or verbally abusing campus staff.” In the interview 
segment the ostensible staff member stated: “Overall I’d say [treatment of staff on campus] is 
pretty bad. I worked in different jobs, and even at different universities for years now, but I never 
been treated worse than here at KU. The administrators here just walk all over you!” This report 
served as the second of two comparison conditions designed to imply no moral threat to the 
ingroup. 
 Finally, in the victimized by the ingroup condition, the narrator of the report stated that 
the results of the study indicated that “overall, the KU staff suffers worse treatment than the 
members of many other university staffs around the country. In particular, KU staff members 
receive harsh treatment from the undergraduate student population. Undergraduates were 
routinely observed publicly humiliating or verbally abusing campus staff.” In the interview 
segment the ostensible staff member stated: “Overall I’d say [treatment of staff on campus] is 
pretty bad. I worked in different jobs, and even at different universities for years now, but I never 
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been treated worse than here at KU. The undergrads here just walk all over you!” This report was 
designed to present a moral threat to the ingroup. 
 Perceptions of victim material entitlement. After listening to the audio report, participants 
completed a measure presented as a “Campus Life Survey.” The first item on the survey referred 
directly to the audio report, and measured perceptions that the victim status of the outgroup 
might make outgroup members eligible for material benefits: “If the results of this study were 
made public, it could ultimately lead to benefits for KU staff, like higher wages and more 
vacation time” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). This item allowed us to control for 
the possibility that any tendencies toward competitive victimhood were driven by perceptions 
that victims receive material benefits. 
Noncompetitive and competitive victimhood. Participants then completed three items 
measuring noncompetitive victimhood claims on behalf of the ingroup: “At times, I f el
negatively discriminated against because of my status as an undergraduate student,” “KU 
undergraduates are discriminated against on campus because of their status as students,” and 
“KU undergraduates are discriminated against off campus, in other areas of Lawrence, because 
of their status as students” (1 = never, 4 = sometimes, 7 = frequently).  
These items were followed by three items measuring competitive victimhood claims, one 
of which measured competition with the target outgroup, and two of which measured 
competition with unrelated outgroups: “Compared to KU staff, KU undergraduates exp rience 
___________ discrimination,” “Compared to KU graduate students, KU undergraduates 
experience ___________ discrimination,” and “Compared to KU faculty, KU undergraduates 
experience ___________ discrimination” (1 = less overall, 4 = as much, 7 = more overall). 
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Each set of three items was averaged to create two composite measures of noncompetitive (α = 
.85) and competitive (α = .85) victimhood.  
 After completing the survey, participants were debriefed concerning the true purpose of 
the study, and the fact that the audio report was fictitious. 
Results and discussion 
Noncompetitive victimhood. A one-way ANOVA (portrayal of outgroup: non-victimized 
vs. victimized by another group vs. victimized by the ingroup) on our composite measure of 
noncompetitive victimhood yielded a non-significant result, F(2, 29) = .91, p = .42 (MNon-victimized 
= 1.73; MVictimized by another group = 2.28; MVictimized by the ingroup = 2.22). This suggests that our 
manipulation was not simply increasing overall salience of ingroup victimhood. 
Competitive victimhood. As predicted, a similar analysis of our competitive victimhood 
composite yielded significance, F(2, 29) = 3.43, p = .04, η2 = .19. 2 Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that, as predicted, participants in the victimized-by-the-ingroup condition engaged in 
significantly more competitive victimhood (M = 4.74, SD = .72) compared to participants in the 
non-victimized (M = 3.57, SD = 1.28; t(29) = 2.37, p = .02) and victimized-by-another-group 
conditions (M = 3.69, SD = 1.1; t(29) = 2.25, p = .03). Means for the non-victimized and 
victimized-by-another-group condition participants did not differ, t < 1, p = .78 (see Figure 2 for 
a graphical depiction of these results).  
 Perceptions of victim material entitlement. To determine if competitive victimhood or 
any effects of condition were related to perceptions of the victim outgroup as materially entitled, 
we performed the same ANOVA on our single-item measure of victim entitlement. The effect of 
condition was non-significant, F < 1, p = .67 (MNon-victimized = 3.50; MVictimized by another group = 4.08; 
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MVictimized by the ingroup = 3.89). Furthermore, perceptions of the victim outgroup as materially 
entitled were not significantly correlated with competitive victimhood claims, r = .01, p = .94. 
 KU undergraduates who were exposed to a portrayal of KU staff as victimized by the 
ingroup engaged in more competitive victimhood than undergraduates exposed to a portrayal of 
KU staff as non-victimized or as victimized by another group (KU administrators). Portrayal of 
the outgroup affected competitive victimhood specifically, and not noncompetitive perc ptions 
of the ingroup as victimized without reference to other groups. Furthermore, participants 
responded to accusations of ingroup harmdoing by competing for victim status relaive not only 
to the target outgroup, but to all relevant outgroups. 
 While providing a conceptual replication of the competitive victimhood effect from 
Study 1 in a different intergroup context, these results also make several advances. First, the fact 
that competitive victimhood did not occur when the outgroup was portrayed as undeservedly 
victimized by another group supports the claim that competitive victimhood is a unique response 
to the moral identity threat posed by accusations of ingroup harmdoing. Second, distinguishing 
competitive from noncompetitive victimhood claims provides direct evidence for the importance 
of the hypothesized moral comparative aspect of competitive victimhood. Third, by observing 
competitive victimhood in a non-dichotomous intergroup context, we were able to determine that 
motivated competitive victimhood in the face of moral threat occurs in reference to all relevant 
outgroups, and not only in relation to the target outgroup, further establishing the social 
comparative aspect of this phenomenon.  
General Discussion 
 Two studies examining two different intergroup contexts demonstrated that, in respo s  
to accusations of ingroup harmdoing, members of higher status groups compete for ingroup
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victim status relative to other groups. In Study 1, men exposed to a portrayal of women as 
undeservedly victimized by men were more likely (than men exposed to portrayals of women as 
non-victimized or self-victimized) to claim that men are discriminated against compared to 
women. In Study 2, undergraduates accused of discriminating against university staff were more 
likely (than undergraduates exposed to portrayals of staff as non-victimized or victimized by 
administrators) to claim that their group is discriminated against compared to s veral relevant 
outgroups (staff, faculty, and graduate students). Taken together, these studies suggest that 
competitive victimhood is contingent on the threat implied by ingroup responsibility for 
outgroup victimization, and does not follow from information suggesting that the outgroup itself 
or a third group is responsible for the outgroup’s victimization. Furthermore, these sudi s 
showed competitive victimhood to be independent of perceptions of material benefits to be 
gained from making claims to victimization, and noncompetitive perceptions of the ingroup as 
generally victimized. 
 The present research identifies competitive victimhood as one strategy individuals use to 
defend against accusations that their ingroup has committed illegitimate harm. Future research is 
required to better establish the theorized process behind competitive victimhood. For instance, if 
competitive victimhood is indeed a response to an induced moral identity threat, the effect of a 
threat manipulation on competitive victimhood should be mediated by some measured feeling of 
threat or anxiety in connection with the ingroup. Furthermore, if claiming relativ  victim status 
does in fact restore or boost moral credentials after accusations of ingroup harmdoing, then we 
should observe competitive victimhood leading to outcomes such as an inflated sense of ingroup 
morality or entitlement. Another important question for future research is where competitive 
victimhood stands in relation to other established strategies – such as victim-blaming cognitions 
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– known to be used in response to allegations of outgroup victimization. Given that other 
strategies exist for coping with such threats, when will competitive victimhood be preferred over 
other modes of identity defense?  
A future direction: Competitive victimhood versus victim-blaming 
 Competitive victimhood is one strategy individuals use to counter the moral threat 
implied by accusations of ingroup harmdoing. However, as alluded to in the Introduction, there 
are many ways of maintaining or restoring ingroup moral credentials when confronted with 
information suggesting that an outgroup has been illegitimately victimized by the ingroup. 
Indeed, competitive victimhood might not be the most straightforward or commonly preferred 
strategy for coping with such accusations, given that victim status, though often mrally 
enhancing, can have negative connotations. Theory (Harvey, 1995; Ryan, 1976) and research 
(e.g., Miron et al., 2006) suggest that people often deal with accusations that their group has 
victimized another by simply refuting the claim with a variety of legitimiz ng or “victim-
blaming” cognitions. Such cognitions include: claiming that the alleged harm suffered by the 
outgroup either did not occur or was not moral harm (i.e., the harm arose from legitimate or 
unavoidable circumstances); claiming that any harm that did occur was at leat partly the fault of 
the outgroup and therefore is deserved; and/or claiming that the outgroup is strategically us ng 
claims to victimhood to achieve illegitimate ends (Harvey, 1995). By employing such 
legitimizing cognitions, individuals can immediately defuse any threat that might have been 
inherent in accusations of ingroup harmdoing. 
 When will individuals prefer to use a victim-blaming over a competitive victimhood 
strategy in response to threats to the ingroup’s moral identity? Cole (2007) identifies two 
potentially important factors. The first is the apparent objectivity of the claim to victimization by 
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the ingroup. If there is seemingly incontrovertible evidence suggesting that the ingroup has in 
fact been victimizing the outgroup, then it is unlikely that ingroup members will employ a 
victim-blaming strategy to dispute the outgroup’s claim to victimhood. Rather, when the 
outgroup’s claim seems indisputable, it is more likely that ingroup members will acknowledge 
the claim but defend against its moral implications by engaging in competitive victimhood. 
 A second, more subtle factor becomes important when the outgroup’s claim to 
victimization has not been indisputably established. Cole (2007) argues that, in the absence of 
clear objectivity regarding an outgroup victimhood claim, individuals make a heuristic decision 
about the legitimacy of the claim based on a rough characterization of the outgroup. Specifically, 
Cole posits that two distinct “schemas” for classifying victims have developed in modern 
Western society: the schema of the “good” and the “bad” victim. The good victim type is 
characterized by silence and perseverance in the face of victimization; despite the reality of her 
suffering, the good victim does not complain or seek redress, but bears discrimination with quiet 
“dignity,” and sometimes even sees her victimization as a source of character-building strength. 
This victim type is referred to as “good” from the perspective of the dominant social group 
because such an attitude towards victimization is relatively non-threatening to the perpetrator. 
Alternatively, the bad victim engages in open complaint regarding her status, seeking to establish 
an “ethical relationship” with the perpetrator in which the perpetrator acknowledges wrongdoing, 
and the victim is thereby accorded moral credentials and possibly even material reparations (see 
also Moscovici & Pérez, 2009). Obviously, this victim type is labeled “bad” from the dominant 
group perspective because victims of this sort actively seek recognition from perpetrators of their 
moral debt. Consistent with this view, Kaiser and Miller (2003) have empirically demonstrated 
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that majority group members dislike minority group members who make open accusations of 
discrimination.  
 According to Cole (2007), in the absence of inarguable objective evidence concerning a 
claim to victimhood, people will judge the legitimacy of a group’s alleged victim status based 
solely on their classification of the group as fitting either the good or bad victim type. Two 
inherent errors of judgment make this process of reaching decisions about the legitimacy of a 
group’s victim status rather dubious. First, it should be clear that whether a group or individual 
fits the good or bad victim type has nothing to do with the presence or absence of actual 
discrimination against the group; this designation is only concerned with how the potential 
victim behaves in response to real or imagined victimization. Second, this heuristic clearly puts 
the potential victim in an ironic double-bind: the moment a group seeks acknowledgment of their 
victim status, they become bad victims, and the legitimacy of the victim status they are seeking 
becomes stillborn. Regardless, Cole asserts that dominant group members make decisions about 
the legitimacy of victimhood claims in this way, no doubt in large part because they are 
motivated to classify potential victims as bad and thereby absolve themselves of potential moral 
debt. Where objective evidence is not directly apparent, people tend to see those who ar seeking 
acknowledgment of their victimhood as bad victims who must have ulterior motivations for 
undeserved moral credentials, pity, or reparations. When the group fits the good victim type, 
however, claims to victimhood cannot be tarnished by victim-blaming accusations of insidious 
motives, and the positive moral status of victimhood remains intact. 
 Cole’s analysis thus offers two predictions concerning when dominant group members 
are more likely to respond to accusations of harmdoing with a victim-blaming versus a 
competitive victimhood strategy. First, as stated, when the objectivity of the outgroup’s victim 
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status cannot be disputed, the legitimacy of claims to victimhood in general remains int ct and 
dominant group members are likely to respond to the accusation by shoring up their own relative 
victim status, decreasing the potential moral gap. Second, when the objectivity of the outgroup’s 
victimhood has not been clearly established, classification of the outgroup as either good or bad 
victims should determine whether dominant group members respond to an accusation by 
competing for good victim status or derogating bad victims. If outgroup members are behaving 
like good victims, the legitimacy of their status remains intact, and dominant group members 
should again respond by competing for victim status. However, if outgroup members can be 
classified as bad victims, then the legitimacy of their threatening claim to victimhood need never 
be acknowledged by dominant group members, who can instead defuse any potential moral 
threat by simply engaging in victim-blaming strategies without incurring a y of the potential 
costs of claiming victimhood. 
 In the current studies, participants were not given the opportunity to blame the victim or 
deny the legitimacy of the outgroup’s victim status. However, in each study objective scientific 
evidence was offered in support of the claim to the outgroup’s victimhood, so we would have 
expected participants to pursue competitive victimhood over victim-blaming strategies when the 
ingroup was accused even if the other option had been available. In a study currently underway, 
we are attempting to directly test the moderating influence of the perceived l gitimacy of the 
outgroup’s victim status on the preference for competitive victimhood versus victim-blaming 
defenses.  
Investigating the process once more in the context of the university power hierarc y, with 
university staff as the victimized outgroup, we are conducting a 2 (perpetrator: undergraduates 
vs. administrators) X 3 (legitimacy of outgroup victimhood: objective evidence vs. good victim
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vs. bad victim) between-subjects experiment. Specifically, undergraduate participants read a 
fabricated campus newspaper article containing both of our manipulations. In all co ditions, 
university staff are described as victimized; however, in three conditions, the ingroup 
(undergraduates) is the perpetrator group, while in the three remaining conditions another group 
(administrators) is the perpetrator. Our second variable is manipulated in the following manner: 
in the objective evidence condition, university staff are making a claim to victimhood for which 
they have clear evidence (e.g., videotape records); in the good victim condition, no objective 
evidence is presented, but the staff have good victim status because while they ar  silent about 
their victimization, a third party (a local labor organization) is making a victimhood claim for 
them; and in the bad victim condition, the staff are making their own claim to victimization 
without objective evidence. After reading the newspaper article, participants are given the 
opportunity to engage in both competitive victimhood (measured as in Study 2) and victim-
blaming strategies (minimizing the harm, claiming that the outgroup is partly responsible, and 
attributing ulterior motives to the outgroup for claiming victimhood; Harvey, 1995). The order of 
presentation of these measures is counterbalanced to control for any possible order effects.  
If Cole’s analysis is correct, we should observe an interactive effect of our independent 
variables on both the competitive victimhood and victim-blaming dependent measures. In th  
case of competitive victimhood, we would expect participants to pursue this strategy wh n the 
ingroup is accused and when there is either objective evidence or the outgroup fits the good 
victim type. Alternatively, we would expect to see greater use of the victim-blaming strategy 
when the ingroup is accused and the outgroup fits the bad victim type. Such evidence would 
provide strong support for the theorized importance of perceptions of the outgroup’s claim to 
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victimhood as legitimate in determining whether competitive victimhood will occur in response 
to accusations of ingroup harmdoing. 
Broader implications 
 Conceptions of the ingroup’s collective victimhood have historically been an important 
source of identity for marginalized groups or groups in intractable conflicts (Volkan, 1997), and 
appear to have become an increasingly positive source of identity in recent periods as victim 
status has gained moral status (Moscovici & Pérez, 2009). While victim status has notpreviously 
been an important component of identity for dominant group members (Nealon, 2000), the 
present work shows that members of objectively higher status groups will engage i competitive 
victimhood at least temporarily to defend the ingroup against moral threat. This evidence 
certainly speaks to the emerging viability of competitive victimhood as a strategy for 
establishing or defending group moral credentials. But it also further suggests the possibility that 
even some dominant group members may be beginning to incorporate aspects of victim status 
into their identity. As mentioned in the Introduction, some dominant group members have begun 
to resent widespread acknowledgment of the legitimacy of minority groups’ victim statuses, and 
to see themselves as the “true victims” of corrective policies like welfare, sexual harassment 
legislation, affirmative action, and so on (Cole, 2007; Lynch, 1989). Nealon (2000) argues that 
such perceptions are becoming an important aspect of the identity of those he classifi s as “angry 
white males:” dominant group members who see themselves as the only real victims in a society 
of alleged victims. Future research might investigate the extent to which competitive claims to 
victimhood, which have their origins in the moral threat implied by accusations of ingrup 
harmdoing, are actually becoming an important identity aspect for even dominant group 
members in the modern cultural climate. 
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 This research might be especially important because, as Nealon (2000) suggests, the 
competition of dominant group members for victim status may be a serious impediment to 
rectifying the situation of lower status groups in society. As the aforemention d research by 
Zitek et al. (2010) and Wohl and Branscombe (2008) suggests, perceiving the ingroup as 
relatively victimized should elicit feelings of entitlement as well as forgiveness for ingroup 
transgressions, and reduce empathic reactions to the suffering of others. If dominant group 
members are indeed experiencing a heightened sense of ingroup righteousness as a r ult of 
competitive victimhood processes, this should decrease their motivation to take action to aid 
more objectively victimized groups in society. 
 The present phenomenon should also be considered from the perspective of members of 
marginalized groups. First, there is the question of whether minority group members also engage 
in competitive victimhood. Some sociological work (Todorov, 2005) suggests that members of 
minority groups will occasionally engage in competitive victimhood with other minorit es, and 
the theoretical analysis presented here certainly suggests they may do so under conditions of 
moral threat. Beyond this issue, however, the present work has important implications for 
members of victimized groups and their (public) relationship to their victimhood. Given that 
dominant group members may respond to lower status groups’ claims to victimhood with 
competitive victimhood, the question for minority individuals becomes whether presenting the 
group’s image as victimized is an effective means of achieving positive social change.  
 To take the oppression of women as an example, feminist thinkers have debated this very 
issue extensively (for a review, see Stringer, 2000). Some critics (e.g., Roiphe, 1993; Wolf, 
1993) of “mainstream” feminism have argued that modern women’s search for greater equality 
has been publicly framed and understood too much in terms of a nonproductive identity politics 
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of collective victimhood. On the other hand, scholars like Brown (1995) have questioned 
whether or not the project of acknowledging and eliminating the oppression of women is 
possible without women as a group making claims to victimhood and establishing an identity
that is at least partially founded in an awareness of their victimization. While establishing a 
positive, legitimate victim identity may be a critical step in the advancement of victimized 
groups, it is important to recognize that claims to such an identity may be countered by 
competitive victimhood from the dominant outgroup. New means of conceptualizing victimhood 
and breaking cycles of competition for victim status should be developed to improve relations 
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1. Our measure of male identification was included as a potential moderator, given that high 
group identifiers are often more defensive in response to threats (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Manstead, 1998). We ran regression analyses to determine whether the eff cts of the 
outgroup portrayal manipulation might be moderated by the extent to which participants 
identified as a man (note that the distribution was negatively skewed, MGrand = 5.67 on a 7-point 
scale). Specifically, competitive victimhood scores were regressed onto outgr up portrayal 
(contrast-coded: victimized by the ingroup = 1, non-victimized = -.5, self-victimized = -.5), 
identification as a male (centered and continuous), and their interaction. This analysis revealed 
only the main effect for outgroup portrayal, β = .32, t(45) = 2.29, p = .03 (all other ts < 1, ns). 
 
2. To determine whether there was any difference in competitive victimhood claims as a function 
of reference group, we also separately analyzed competition with only the target outgroup (KU 
staff). We found a marginally significant effect of condition, F(2, 29) = 3.17, p = .06, η2 = .17, 
such that participants were more likely to engage in competitive victimhood in the vic imized-
by-the-ingroup compared to the other conditions (MVictimized by the ingroup = 4.56, MNon-ictimized = 3.20, 
MVictimized by another group = 3.53). Overall, the findings from Study 2 suggest that when individuals 
are motivated to engage in competitive victimhood to compensate for harm done to an outgroup, 
they will compete not only with the relevant outgroup but with other reference groups as well. 
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Appendix 2: Transcripts of audio reports for outgroup portrayal manipulation (Study 2) 
 
Non-victimized condition 
Researcher: A study was recently conducted to examine the daily experience and 
treatment of staff on the University of Kansas campus. This study was the result of collaboration 
between researchers in the psychology, sociology, and economics departments here a  KU, as 
well as with visiting researchers from other universities. The research proess involved 
interviews and non-obtrusive observation of over 100 KU staff members. This included custo ial 
and office staff, as well as non-student employees in the libraries, museums, and campus 
eateries. Additionally, members of the faculty and administration, as well as students themselves, 
were interviewed and completed surveys regarding their experiences with the university staff.  
The study found that, overall, the KU staff receives treatment that is comparable to that 
of the members of many other university staffs around the country. In particular, KU staff 
members receive fair treatment from students and administrators. Staff members sometimes 
receive public compliments and verbal acknowledgments for their work. In addition, most people 
on campus follow basic rules of etiquette, leaving campus bathrooms and other public spaces 
relatively clean, which makes staff duties easier.  
More than 75% percent of KU students and administrators report somewhat positive 
attitudes towards the staff, calling them “motivated” and “efficient.” Eighty percent of campus 
staff members report that they are well treated almost every day. The following is a short 
segment from a recorded interview with one custodial staff member… 
Interviewer: So, how would you describe the treatment you receive on campus? 
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Staff member: Well, overall I’d say it’s pretty good. I’ve worked in a lot of different jobs, 
I’ve worked at a lot of different universities for a…bunch of years now, and I feel treated just as 
good here at KU as anywhere else. Most people are fairly decent to you. 
Researcher: In general, the findings of this study indicate that the majority of KU staff 
members are happy with the treatment they receive on campus, and the good campus atmosphere 
is the primary source of their feelings. 
 
Victimized-by-another-group condition 
Researcher: A study was recently conducted to examine the daily experience and 
treatment of staff on the University of Kansas campus. This study was the result of collaboration 
between researchers in the psychology, sociology, and economics departments here a  KU, as 
well as with visiting researchers from other universities. The research proess involved 
interviews and non-obtrusive observation of over 100 KU staff members. This included custo ial 
and office staff, as well as non-student employees in the libraries, museums, and campus 
eateries. Additionally, members of the faculty and administration, as well as students themselves, 
were interviewed and completed surveys regarding their experiences with the university staff.  
The study found that, overall, the KU staff suffers worse treatment than the members of 
many other university staffs around the country. In particular, KU staff members receive harsh 
treatment from the campus administration. Representatives of the administration were routinely 
observed publicly humiliating or verbally abusing campus staff. In addition, KU administrators 
routinely ignore basic rules of etiquette, leaving campus bathrooms and other public spaces dirty 
and full of waste for the staff to clean up.  
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More than 75% percent of KU administrators report negative attitudes towards the staff, 
calling them “lazy,” “annoying,” and “slow.” Eighty percent of campus staff members report that 
they are mistreated by administrators on an almost daily basis. The following is a short segment 
from a recorded interview with one custodial staff member… 
Interviewer: So, how would you describe the treatment you receive on campus? 
Staff member: Well, overall I’d say it’s pretty bad. I’ve worked in a lot of different jobs, 
I’ve worked at a lot of different universities for a…bunch of years now, but I never ben treated 
worse than here at KU. The administrators here…they just walk all over you! 
Researcher: In general, the findings of this study indicate that the majority of KU staff 
members are not happy with the treatment they receive on campus, and the administration s the 
primary source of their mistreatment. 
 
Victimized-by-the-ingroup condition 
Researcher: A study was recently conducted to examine the daily experience and 
treatment of staff on the University of Kansas campus. This study was the result of collaboration 
between researchers in the psychology, sociology, and economics departments here a  KU, as 
well as with visiting researchers from other universities. The research proess involved 
interviews and non-obtrusive observation of over 100 KU staff members. This included custo ial 
and office staff, as well as non-student employees in the libraries, museums, and campus 
eateries. Additionally, members of the faculty and administration, as well as students themselves, 
were interviewed and completed surveys regarding their experiences with the university staff.  
The study found that, overall, the KU staff suffers worse treatment than the members of 
many other university staffs around the country. In particular, KU staff members receive harsh 
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treatment from the undergraduate student population. Undergraduates were routinely bserved 
publicly humiliating or verbally abusing campus staff. In addition, KU undergraduates routinely 
ignore basic rules of etiquette, leaving campus bathrooms and other public spaces dirty and full 
of waste for the staff to clean up.  
More than 75% of undergraduate students report negative attitudes towards the staff, 
calling them “lazy,” “annoying,” and “slow.” Eighty percent of campus staff members report that 
they are mistreated by undergraduates on an almost daily basis. The following is a short segment 
from a recorded interview with one custodial staff member… 
Interviewer: So, how would you describe the treatment you receive on campus? 
Staff member: Well, overall I’d say it’s pretty bad. I’ve worked in a lot of different jobs, 
I’ve worked at a lot of different universities for a…bunch of years now, but I never ben treated 
worse than here at KU. The undergraduates here…they just walk all over you! 
Researcher: In general, the findings of this study indicate that the majority of KU staff 
members are not happy with the treatment they receive on campus, and the undergraduate 
population is the primary source of their mistreatment. 
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Figure 1. Competitive victimhood as a function of outgroup portrayal condition (Study 1). 
 
Note. Scale ranged from 1-7. A response of 4 signified, “In society, compared to women, men 








Figure 2. Competitive victimhood as a function of outgroup portrayal condition (Study 2). 
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